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ABSTRACT
While the applications and demands of Machine learning (ML) sys-
tems in mental health are growing, there is little discussion nor
consensus regarding a uniquely challenging aspect: building secu-
rity methods and requirements into these ML systems, and keep
the ML system usable for end-users. This question of usable secu-
rity is very important, because the lack of consideration in either
security or usability would hinder large-scale user adoption and
active usage of ML systems in mental health applications.
In this short paper, we introduce a framework of four pillars,
and a set of desired properties which can be used to systematically
guide and evaluate security-related designs, implementations, and
deployments of ML systems for mental health. We aim to weave to-
gether threads from different domains, incorporate existing views,
and propose new principles and requirements, in an effort to lay
out a clear framework where criteria and expectations are estab-
lished, and are used to make security mechanisms usable for end-
users of those ML systems in mental health. Together with this
framework, we present several concrete scenarios where different
usable security cases and profiles in ML-systems in mental health
applications are examined and evaluated.
KEYWORDS
Mental Health, Machine Learning (ML), Security, Usability, Evalu-
ation, Computer System Life Cycle, Failure Modes
1 INTRODUCTION
With a mental health crisis looming large and many ML systems
being built for mental health use cases, it is challenging to trace,
analyze, and compare all the designs and implementations of such
systems. So far, there is a lack of well-defined framework that de-
scribes properties relating to the security of such ML systems in
mental health, and even less considerations are given to how such
security mechanisms can be usable for those systems’ end users.
However, without usable security, undiscovered, undisclosed, and
ill-considered limitations and properties of security decisionswould
hold back large-scale adoption and usage[2] of ML systems in men-
tal health use cases. Formore detailed and nuanced discussions, see
our treatment at section 4.3.
The goal of this framework is to establish discussions in commu-
nities of mental health, ML, and security, so we can build a com-
mon ground for directions and expectations for usable security in
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ML systems used in mental health scenarios. Moreover, this frame-
work serves to raise awareness, so that bothML and mental health
communities will heed this critical aspect of usable security in ML
systems for mental health. We hope that this new, interdisciplinary
framework would allow researchers and practitioners to system-
atically compare usable security attributes across ML systems for
mental health, meanwhile to identify potential limitations of par-
ticular approaches and trade-offs in different scenarios.
In this short paper,we propose thatML systems inmental health
use cases, beyond the privacy and security requirements already
mandated by legislation’s and regulations — for example, Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA)[38, 43, 64]
in United States, and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
in European Union and its member states’ national laws[11, 12]
— should consider properties of usable security proposed by this
framework’s four pillars, and be evaluated on their (1)contextmod-
els, (2)functionality criteria, (3)trustworthiness requirements,
and (4)recovery principles across their life cycles.
This work presents our effort to generate discussions and con-
sensus for a common framework in a naturally interdisciplinary
area. We built our research on the foundation of computer security
research, which has a rich history and long tradition of devising
criteria and evaluation rubrics for system designs and implemen-
tations. We also incorporated important and recent literature from
human-computer interaction (HCI), usable security, and fairness,
accountability, and transparency (FAT) research of ML. Weaving
these interdisciplinary threads together, we hope that our frame-
work will benefit both researchers and practitioners working on
ML systems in mental health.
2 RELATED WORK
There is a long and distinguished tradition in computer security re-
search: presciently define evaluation criteria and structure assess-
ment frameworks, while research communities were still in their
early stages of formation. From this tradition, many remarkable
security research outcomes have flourished, and guided the design
and building of systems and infrastructure we rely on today[21,
22, 30, 31, 37, 51, 67]. However, while the pioneers of security re-
search laid down “psychological acceptability” of users as a key
principle for secure system design and implementations[49], this
principle has not been actively researched within the security com-
munity until much later while security measures keep confusing
even experts[3, 10, 54, 68, 71]. Moreover, the “psychological accept-
ability” principle is often doubted as incompatible with the goal of
“security”[7, 15, 44, 47, 56, 63, 69, 71], and much of usable security
research has traditionally been done in the HCI community, and
usable security is still a small community[41, 45, 65] compared to
other areas of security research.
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While “psychological acceptability” principle is first identified
as the meaning of “usable” in “usable security” [49, 71], there are
other efforts trying to precisely define “usability” especially in HCI
contexts, based on the “human-centered” attribute of interactive
systems. A prominent example is ISO 9241-210 [23]: “usability” is
“the extent to which a product can be used by specifiedusers to achieve
specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a spec-
ified context of use”. Built on this definition, [62] of NIST proposed
measurements on usability evaluations.
However, as [62, 71] both point out, measurement of usable se-
curity can be highly diverse and context-dependent, meanwhile,
such measurements and evaluations focus on the system and its in-
teractionswith targeted users, often donewith small groups in con-
trolled environments[32, 42], with security as the users’ top con-
cern. While the “security is top priority” assumption can be very
reasonable for use cases such as national and corporate security,
the same assumption likely does not stand when we are evaluating
ML systems in mental health use cases, in which users have diverse
top priorities. This complicates the already fragmented landscape[26]
of usable security, and while ML applications in mental health and
FAT ML research are booming[53, 57], they still do not take usabil-
ity and security into serious consideration.
3 USABLE SECURITY PILLARS FOR ML
SYSTEMS
Our framework evaluates usable security of ML systems in mental
health based on four pillars. Each pillar, in turn, serves as the top
concern for each major phase of the computer system life cycle,
which can be summarized as: (1)design and implementation; (2)de-
ployment; (3)mass adoption and usage; and finally, (4)maintenance
and/or disposal[39, 40, 46].
(1) Context: this pillar considers the intended operational en-
vironment of the ML system, and how it is designed and
built to interact with different types of users with varying
purposes, goals, and maliciousness. This pillar is most im-
portant during the design and implementation phase of ML
systems for mental health.
(2) Functionality: this pillar tackles the well-known security-
functionality trade-off[4, 25, 27, 35, 71]. Keeping ML sys-
tems functional while making security usable, it is imper-
ative to ask questions about the complexity and resource-
intensity of security methods within the already complex
and often resource-intensive ML system, the flexibility of
chosen methods to accommodate future security require-
ments, and how they influence user interactions with the
ML system. This pillar is most crucial in the deployment
phase of ML systems, especially in the initial stage, when
such system is in limited use, without users’ significant in-
vestment of trust and time.
(3) Trustworthiness: this pillar is by nature user-centered. Many
non-expert, lay users are already distrustful and leery of
ML, and this set of requirements show that on the matter
of security and usability, ML systems may still induce users’
trust in the sensitive context of mental health. This pillar is
the most critical in achieving active usage and large-scale
adoption[2] of secure ML systems for mental health.
(4) Recovery: this pillar handles perhaps one of the toughest
challenges in both security and usability: what happens, should
a security incident (e.g. a breach, a compromise, or a pre-
viously undiscovered vulnerability) happens? What are we
going to do with the system and users, now and later? How
do we account for the incident this time, to minimize the
chance that it would happen again? This pillar is the top
priority in maintenance and/or disposal phase of the com-
puter system life cycle.
3.1 Context Models
The list can help ask the right questions for designing and build-
ing usable security[51] into ML systems for mental health: it deter-
mines what and how much “usability” to be considered in a secu-
rity environment, and move from the more general security threat
models, to specific cases of user interactions in mental health sce-
narios, and also to weigh in negative use cases. The properties be-
low are agnostic to programming languages, software stacks, de-
ployment platforms, and hardware specifications, so they are also
flexible enough to accommodate a large class of usable security
scenarios for ML systems in mental health.
C1 Asset Audit. ML systems in mental health almost inevitably
acquire information assets while in use, for example, it may include
users’ locations, device types etc., as well as patients’ functional
status information, providers’ notes, and organization’s interven-
tion plans. Understandably, existing regulations mostly focus on
these acquired assets. However, in ML systems, “asset” is not only
acquired, but also native to the system itself: its algorithms and
models, ground truths, datasets, decision-making logic, and result
evaluations, etc. Therefore, identifying both native and acquired
assets of the ML system is critical for usable security.
C2 Target User Profiling. ML systems can be utilized by differ-
ent stakeholders in mental health: from patients, providers, to gov-
ernment officials, they use the system to achieve different goals.
Profiling the system’s targeted users is the basis to make concrete
observations and reasonable estimations, which are then incorpo-
rated into design and implementation requirements. Knowing the
targeted users and what they use the ML system for, this is us-
able security’s positive case: legitimate users can establish trusted
paths and use the system without being hindered by its security
requirements. Usable security’s negative case is given in C4.
C3 Behaviors Categorization. Behaviors of targeted legitimated
users described in C2 can be either expected by the system, or un-
expected and cause the system to fail, error out, or even trigger
security incidents. While it is not possible to iterate through all
unexpected behaviors from legitimate users, unexpected user be-
haviors raise two key components of usable security, and need to
be addressed in design and implementation: (1) motivating users
to behave in a secure manner so to minimize the systems’ failures,
errors, and security exposures, because users are not the enemy[3];
(2) when such motivations fail, follow the “fail-safe” principle[49],
meanwhile deliver warning messages about security and failures
with usability in mind [5, 50, 58]. This property is interdependent
with F5, where we discuss robustness.
C4 ThreatModeling.Once the assets are audited and target users
and behaviors profiled, threat modeling is essential for security,
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as threat modeling is a well-studied and used subject in computer
security[17, 33, 48, 55]. There are three main components to con-
sider: (1) assets the ML system needs to protect, (2) scope of inter-
actions between system and user based on C3; and (3) malicious
actors and their actions the systems need to defend against. In con-
trast toC2,malicious actors are usable security’s negative case: ma-
licious users are stopped or slowed down by the system’s security
measures.
3.2 Functionality Criteria
The following properties are most useful when seen from a deploy-
ment perspective. They describe how a ML system works with in-
place security requirements while interacting with users.
F1Complexity.Most, if not all ML systems and applications have
at least one of the three constraints: time, memory, and compu-
tational power. Therefore, any security measures should consider
these constraints and its impact on howwell the ML system serves
the end users. For example, in a high concurrency event where
many users are utilizing the same ML system, if a given security
method uses negligible computational power resource on users’
end but consumers a lot of system resources, we should consider
alternatives for this security method. To measure such complex-
ity, we can use either formal algorithmic complexity notions (e.g.
Big O, little O), or empirical evaluations. For example, in 10-user,
100-user, 1,000-user concurrency scenarios, what is the average
computational overhead or latency for specific sets of security re-
quirements, with other software and hardware constraints stay the
same.
F2 Availability. For large-scale ML systems, e.g. mental health
use cases with multiple targeted user groups, security measures
also need to scale. Availability evaluates how well security meth-
ods can generalize to cover a ML system’s targeted users and be-
haviors (C2, C3) without hindering their access to the ML system.
A quantitative heuristic for availability of security measures is es-
timated user adoption rates across user groups, as well as among
the genera user base.
Notice that the availability criteria is a trade-off to the “least
common mechanism” principle for secure system design[49], and
the relative importance between the two are dependent on results
of Context Modeling, in particular C4. Regardless of which one of
the two weighs more heavily in specific scenarios, the security
mechanism in question must be carefully designed, judiciously im-
plemented, and rigorously tested before real user runs.
F3 Flexibility. Retrofitting security to usability is usually a bad
idea and doesn’t work well[7, 69], therefore it is important to not
only prioritize usable security when designing and building ML
systems for mental health, but also to not let current implemen-
tations become roadblocks to additional security requirements or
system capabilities. Having flexibility accommodates future changes
in the system and shifting user base, and is a long-term commit-
ment to the system’s usable security traits.
F4 Experience Validation.To ascertain that securitymeasures did
not hold back users, it is crucial to validate real user interactions
and experience with the system, regardless of the methods: ideal
controlled environments, synthetic experiments, or random sam-
pling. For positive case of usable security (C2) that makes the sys-
tem more secure but not harder for legitimate users, conducting
user studies to evaluate their experiences, interactions, effective-
ness, and satisfactions with the system[29, 60] would be indispens-
able evidence for the ML system’s real-world usability.
F5Robustness. Robustness is well-researched in computer system[1,
6, 18, 36, 59], and recent interests in adversarial ML[8, 9, 16] has
early roots in ML robustness[61]. In our consideration, robustness
is also related to recovery principles in section 3.4, and has two an-
gles: (1) for security, to tolerate and withstand certain errors and
faults from the ML layer, the system layer, and user interaction
layer; and (2) for usability, to communicates to users clearly and
timely, when trusted paths cannot be established because of sce-
narios exceeding (1)’s robustness levels. Interdependent with this
criterion is C3 for unexpected user behavior categorization.
3.3 Trustworthiness Requirements
Many non-experts are suspicious and distrustful of ML, because of
ML’s “blackbox magic” reputation. Moreover, the technical nature
of FAT ML methods has not endeared lay users towards machine
learning either. Now, suppose that another layer of hard-to-use and
hard-to-navigate security measures and designs is added to an ML
system, such distrust is perhaps only going to grow more intense
and open.
While the users’ sentiment of distrust is understandable, the
need for good mental health is agnostic about one’s feelings to-
wards machine learning and usability of security designs. There-
fore, to enable active usage and large-scale adoption[2] of secure
ML systems in mental health cases, it is important to first induce
users’ trust in the ML systems used, before their active utilization
of such ML systems. The trustworthiness requirement suggests
how ML systems in mental health may still earn users’ trust, through
its security and usability, by well-designed user interactions and com-
munications.
T1Clarity.Articulating relevant securitymechanisms, and their
intents, impacts, and implications to users, is fundamental to trust-
building.We identified three clarity aspects: (1)clarity ofML, where
certain artifacts of the ML system’s decision-making logic and pro-
cess (e.g. summary statistics, explanations for classification labels)
are exposed and explained to user in non-technicalmanners; (2)clar-
ity of security, where user-facing securitymechanisms (e.g. trusted
path establishment, or revocation of access delegation), and these
mechanisms’ intents and purposes, are disclosed before users en-
gage in these security mechanisms and take actions, preferably in
non-technical terms; and (3)clarity of failure modes, where recov-
ery (section 3.4) plan in case of security incidents, is summarized
and communicated to users in non-technical terminology.
T2 Constraints. Complementary to T1, whose focus is on pos-
itive cases — i.e. what can be and is done — this requirement fo-
cuses mostly on negative cases. While providing clarity, ML sys-
tems need to draw boundaries and limitations on their capabili-
ties and responsibilities, and then communicate such information.
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When determining the scope of usable security and communicat-
ing to users, we suggest three main factors: (1) limitations, empha-
sizing what the system cannot do (e.g. delegating access without ex-
plicit user actions from a trusted path), is not authorized to do (e.g.
sharing chatbot history with unknown third parties), or unwilling
to do (e.g. exposing ML models’ features and parameters) for tech-
nical and non-technical reasons; (2) boundaries, concerning what
the user’s actions cannot accomplish; and (3) expectations, deal-
ing with interactions between users and systems, on what users’
expectations for the systems should not be. This requirement may
seem counterintuitive, but it is founded on the “fail-safe” principle
of computer security[14, 49]: the default situation is lack of access
— that is, by default, actions and operations are constrained and
not allowed to execute.
T3 Consistency and Stability. For similar user behaviors under
similar contextual conditions, ideally, usability- and security-related
experience and interactions should be: (1) similar, within fixed ML
systems (data, algorithm, procedure, parameters, input), and (2)
comparable, across different ML systems capable to cover the same
contextual conditions in their use cases. We name it “consistency”
property. Conversely, for the same usability and security methods,
when providedwith the same user behavior inputs, should respond
with similar user experience and interaction.We call this “stability”
property. There properties can help users build their own mental
models for how security mechanisms and the general ML system
work, and align their expectations with the system’s responses.
Note that we controlled the variables (“similar”, “fixed”, “same”)
while describing consistency and stability, therefore consistency is
not constancy, and stability is not staleness. In fact, the dynamic
nature of usable security and the user expectation-system behavior
alignment model are both well-known[24]. The goal of alignment,
is to motivate secure user behavior and raise user’s trust level in
the system, and consistency and stability are inroads to alignment.
T4 Reciprocity. Leveraging the human tendency to return favors,
ML systems in mental health can elicit actions of trust from users,
and motivate their secure behaviors and active engagements, as
HCI research showed[10, 19, 20]: after users receive helpful infor-
mation from a computer system, they are more likely to provide
useful information or actions back to the system. For reciprocity
schemes in ML systems in mental health, we identify two stages:
(1)initial exchange of reciprocity, where after volunteering helpful
information to users, the system prompts user for desirable infor-
mation or behavior input; and (2)continuous engagement, meaning
that after the initial round, if the user reciprocates, the system
should aim tomaintain exchanges with users, when user behaviors
and other contextual conditions warrant so. Depending on specific
areas where the ML system needs to induce trust and motivate be-
haviors (e.g. having users enable security features, or actively use
ML capacities), details of the interaction mechanisms, from the ini-
tial offer of help to ongoing engagement patterns, will vary.
Because reciprocity largely depends on user interactions with
the system, it naturally focuses on usability, and has different trade-
off with security for different context models. Therefore, any reci-
procity schemes must be designed, implemented, and validated ju-
diciously to defend against reciprocity attacks[70].
3.4 Recovery Principles
Good security needs failure modes, and usable security is no excep-
tion. With a variety of assets to protectC1, many functionalities to
perform, and user trust to gain andmaintain, ML systems inmental
health must have a concrete plan for security failures. These princi-
ples lay out a foundation to consider the immediate and long-term
aftermath of security incidents and their responses, so ML systems
in mental health can retain usable security attributes and rebuild
trust with users (T4).
R1 Response. Previous research[28, 62] surveyed security inci-
dents such as user data leaks, but did not address more complex
security challenges to ML systems in mental health, whose sensi-
tive and diverse assets, both native and acquired, make juicy tar-
gets. Therefore, ML systems must have protocols and procedures
in place, timely reviewed and revised, and ready to respond to secu-
rity incidents, to achieve three goals: (1) evaluate scope and impact
of incident, (2) minimize damages to impacted assets, (3) investi-
gate and attribute sources of incident, and most importantly, (4)
rebuild trust in users for the system. (1) through (3) address imme-
diate actions, while (4) is a long-term process that ensures ML sys-
tems can maintain its stay with user bases in mental health. This
principle is related to C1, C4, and trustworthiness requirements.
R2 Provenance and Chronology. The usability of security, in its
failure mode, entails that security failures can be traced, examined,
analyzed, and inform future security decisions, and such need is
satisfied by post-incident provenance and chronology. In ML sys-
tems for mental health, provenance and chronology should not
only supply (1) a time ordering of system events, technical vulner-
abilities or disadvantages, procedural limitations, uncovered edge
cases, user interactions, statistics, and likely warning signals lead-
ing up to the incident, but also (2) records of any changes (e.g. con-
tent, metadata, mode, appearance) in impacted assets (e.g. manip-
ulated ML model parameter, altered user interface, leaked health
history), from when the incident happened, to when it is uncovered.
Both provenance and chronology can be considered for user-facing
purposes as a tool for repair (R3) and to rebuild trustworthiness.
R3 Repair. Post-security-incident repair has two aspects: (1)re-
pairing the system itself, and (2)repairing users’ trust in the system.
(1) is the direct logical next step of R1 and R2 with immediate
impact and results, while (2) tends to be long-term, and is more
difficult — it needs all the building blocks of trustworthiness to
repair users’ trust in ML systems impacted by security incidents,
especially when incidents concern user data, user-system interac-
tion, or even users’ offline behaviors. Repairing trust needs to ad-
dress additional psychological barriers of users, hence harder than
building trust at first, but it is still possible when T2 and T4 are
emphasized and utilized in the repair process.
4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Form & Intent
Our framework is a suggestion, an encouragement, a proposal, and
an invitation to the community to start acknowledging and re-
searching usability and security in ML systems for mental health.
While our framework is not a standardized rubric, we realize that
it may become a foundation for future standards, guidelines, or
recommendations by organizations such as NIST, ISO, or IEEE, for
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usable security in generic interactive ML systems, or specifically
in mental health applications. Previously, standards were issued
on transparency and autonomy in autonomous systems[52], and
we are sanguine about a general consensus on usable security in
ML systems, especially for mental health use cases.
4.2 Scope of Audience & Usage
We intentionally crafted this framework to be agnostic to ML tech-
niques: hence, we can focus on providing a unified structure that
is not only comprehensive enough to cover the current interdisci-
plinary area between traditional computer security, HCI, and ML,
but is also flexible enough to accommodate future changes and
progresses in these areas. We hope this framework can enable re-
searchers and practitioners to:
(1) Identify gaps in security and usability between their theo-
retical capacities, design variances, actual implementations,
and real-world usage patterns; and
(2) Quickly appraise properties of particular security and us-
ability methods to decide on the most appropriate mecha-
nism for their desired use cases.
In addition, our evaluation framework can be used as a report-
ing rubric targeting regulators, government officials, and policy
makers, so they can quickly get all information in one place, in
a clear, structured, and comparable manner.
4.3 A Different Kind of Usable Security
When we speak of “practitioners” in the section above, in the spe-
cific context of ML systems for mental health, there are broadly
two categories that we target:
(1) Security practitioners: in general system security contexts,
security mechanisms and policies are researched, designed,
implemented, tested, maintained, and improved by security
professionals.
(2) ML practitioners: in general ML system contexts, ML practi-
tioners research, apply, curate, train, validate, test, maintain,
improve ML models, algorithms, and date .
Yet, as we discuss usable security in ML systems for mental health,
the matter gets more complex: there are more stakeholders, both
on the system builders’ side, and on the system users’ side. And
on each side, there are multiple considerations, interests, and men-
tal models that come into play. Table 1 below shows the different
stakeholders when we build security to be usable into ML systems
for mental health. Comparing it with Figure 1, the critical differ-
ences between the building usable security into general system ver-
sus into ML systems for mental health can be clearly discerned. To
summarize: there are more stakeholders on the users’ side who de-
serve usable security for their more diverse needs of theML system
for mental health, and there are more stakeholders on the builders’
side who have distinct desires for what they want do with, and
how they wish such system to behave.
For example, while security and ML practitioners desire differ-
ent ideal attributes from the system and those attributes are not
necessarily at odds or contradict with each other, there are trade-
offs to make. Between “strong defense” with implications for pri-
vacy on patient information and “collect data” for training when
Figure 1: From security practitioners to end-users: how se-
curity mechanisms and experiences are built and delivered
in general software systems
Security
practitioner
Users
(Part of the general population
Can usually be described with
cohesive & uniform models
for user needs, behaviors, and actions)
in general, more data is usually better, the builders within them-
selves need to reach a delicate balance first. On the other end, in-
stead of the cohesive andmore-or-less predictable and uniform sets
of actions normally expected from user models built for general
software or ML systems, we now have a diverse set of potential
users, with various sets of actions and behaviors that are not usu-
ally taken into account for in those general purpose software or
ML systems. In those general purpose systems, Figure 1 shows the
path of how security mechanism and experience are delivered to
end users. Behaviors, actions, expectations, and use scenarios of
these end users would be captured in user models, and security
practitioners would design, build, and deploy security measures
and experiences according to those user models. But because of the
diverse and varying expectations and actions from distinct groups
of end users1, such user models would be too narrow and missing
out on legitimate use actions and behaviors. This is a major rea-
son that we crafted this framework: to properly account for and
appreciate the diversity and variety of users and their actions in
ML systems for mental health, with the end goal to bring a usable
and secure experience to all.
4.4 Dynamic Relationships
As described within sections for each of those sub-attributes, those
attributes are not mutually exclusive nor completely independent
from each other. Instead, there are rich and dynamic interactions
between these sub-attributes, both within a single pillar and across
different pillars. Four major types of interactions are list below
with short examples.
(1) Inter-dependence: F5 and C3 are interdependent. In this
case, without behavior categorization, robustness is next to
impossible to plan for or implement; andwithout robustness
measures tested and used in real-life, it would be very hard
to validate if the behavior categorizations are reasonable or
sufficient.
(2) Trade-offs: F2 is a trade-off to the “least common mecha-
nism” principle for secure system design as articulated in
[49]: for security measures to generalize to diverse sets of
targeted users and behaviors, commonality increases and
distinctions decline.
1ManyML systems for mental health involve more than one group of stakeholders as
shown in Table 1. In some cases, it might even be possible for one single ML system
formental health to encounter all the four groups of stakeholders. For example, anML
system analyzing facial and verbal expressions in online therapy sessions: the patient
and the provider conduct sessions, another caregiver review the analysis after session
ends to provide better care, and policy-makers maymonitor some sessions for signals
of large-scale mental health intervention policies.
5
KDD 2020 Workshop: Designing AI in Support of Good Mental Health (GOOD), August 24th, 2020, Jiang and Senge
Table 1: A sample of stakeholders and their potential needs and purposes when building and using ML systems for mental
health. Left of “||”: builder. Right of “||”: potential user
Security practition-
ers
ML practitioners Patients Providers Other caregivers Policy-makers
Strong defense Collect data Get treatment Diagnose patients Use by self Large-scale moni-
toring
Up-time guarantee Monitor & improve
models
Get peer support Treat patients Use on behalf of pa-
tients
Decision-making
(e.g. intervention)
Easy rollback Can validate & test Self-monitor Collaborate with
other providers
Assist patients to use Regulate
East upgrade Models effective for
end-users
Delegate use to other
caregivers
Keep records Monitor patient sta-
tus
Audit
Good maintenance &
recovery
Deployed model not
corrupted
... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
(3) Prioritization: Inmany scenarios, prioritizing particular prin-
ciples before others is themost reasonable and sensible course
of action. For example, a large-scale online platform deliv-
ering automated conversational therapy may prioritize F2
and F5, at the same time de-prioritize trustworthiness re-
quirements based on the assumption that people seeking
online automated services generally have greater trust in
ML systems and technology, and are likely to be technically
proficient enough to navigate security designs built in place.
(4) Complements:T1 andT2 are complementary: they consider
opposite sides of the same issue, and from there, create a
comprehensive view and enables balanced and holistic deci-
sions for usable security designs and implementations.
These dynamic and interactive relationships carry deep implica-
tions for usable security in ML systems for mental health, and we
will explore some examples that showcase these interactive and
dynamic relationships between the properties in section 5.
5 SOME EXAMPLES
We will now apply the four pillared framework, and share several
tangible use cases ofML systems formental health where we evalu-
ate and examine their usable security needs and profiles. This way,
we can concretely demonstrate the practicality of our framework,
illustrate the dynamic and interactive relationships between the
pillars and their corresponding sub-attributes, and showcase the
complex and distinct stakeholder demands for usable security that
warrant such a framework. We will elaborate on example 1 with
brief comparisons and contrasts to the three other examples, and
leave examples 2 to 4 for readers’ exercise.
(1) Chatbot providing conversation-based therapy to young adults
with mental disorders
(2) Auto-diagnosis algorithms of neuro-images for psychiatrists
(3) Personalized matching for providers & patients
(4) ML system analyzing facial and verbal expressions during
tele-therapy sessions
In 1, the chatbot’s context is an online automated services, and
hence is more likely to experience high concurrency requests from
many different users with existing mental disorders, and such on-
line large-scale services may also be needed in times of distress (e.g.
quarantine during COVID-19 global pandemic) to parts of the gen-
eral population. Therefore, its usable security mechanisms need to
prioritize being available and robust enough to handle more users,
and wider ranges behaviors and actions of legitimate users. At the
same time, inducing users’ trust may not be as important, because
we may consider people willing to use online chatbot services are
more trusting towards ML and technology in general. Although,
soon we would see that if security mechanisms and designs are
not usable or robust enough, such assumption of trust may not be
warranted, and if there were any, would be drastically diminished.
The assets it needs to protect are not only the security of its
general software infrastructure, but also its ML algorithms that
generate live conversation responses to users: recall the infamous
incident ofMicrosoft’s chatbot Tay onTwitter[66], cautionmust be
taken to ensure that legitimate users who need the therapy service
could easily and readily access it withoutmuch hassle, and that ma-
licious users could be fended off so they could not manipulate the
algorithms. While this may seem simple at first, we must properly
categorize behaviors of our potential legitimate users, who have
existing mental disorders. Take attention-deficit/hyperactivity dis-
order (ADHD) for instance. Suppose that the chatbot implements
classes of CAPTCHA or reCAPTCHA methods — which may in-
clude text, image, and sound recognition, as well as text and image
matching — to defend against its threat model actors that include
bots and malicious users trying to poison its algorithms. While
these methods may be effective to defend against these threats,
legitimate users with ADHD, whose attention spans are usually
shorter than the general population[34], may be unlikely to com-
plete the CAPTCHAs, especially when there are several ones that
come one after another.
When security defense designs turn legitimate users away, these
users may leave with the idea that such mechanisms built to trick
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them, and the system behind it has no genuine intention to pro-
vide them help, and hence their implied trust in the chatbot when
they first approached this online automated service, may likely di-
minish. Hence, it would be advisable to also take trustworthiness
requirement seriously, especially the constraint property. One way
to demonstrate it, is using clear language or visual images to in-
form users of failures. For instance, when a user’s attention span is
too short to successfully finish a series of reCAPTCHA challenges,
a message displays: “Sorry we could not tell if you are a human or
bot. Do you want to try another way?” This or similar messages
could communicate to legitimate users that the system genuinely
intends to provide services, the reCAPTCHAs are there because it
is a security design, not a farce or trick to turn them away, and
there are certain things that these reCAPTCHAs are not capable
of doing.
Further thoughts bring more usable security considerations to
the discussion on example 1. Should the chatbot store any records
of its user interactions, so that human providers and caregivers
(e.g. parents or legal guardians) of these young adults could mon-
itor their progress, provide better diagnosis, treatment, and care,
thenwe are ontomore complex scenarios. There are now twomore
groups of users to consider, and how to provide usable security for
them is a crucial challenge. Moreover, because now there are stored
user records, there is an additional asset to protect, and the recov-
ery principles need to be elevated to higher priorities, especially
repairing users’ trust in the service in the event of a breach or leak.
This is where flexibility also comes into the picture: if builders of
the chatbot had not originally considered this sharing services, and
only later decided to add it, flexibility of previous security capa-
bilities to accommodate the additional security requirements that
come with sharing user records, is extremely important.
In a base case, even when the chatbot is originally built to not
only converse with patients, but also store their records and allows
them to share their records with their providers and caregivers,
clarity of usable security designs that are informed by behavior
categorization would be integral. For instance, some young adult
patients may decide to simply share their passwords with their
providers and caretakers for the latter groups to look at their chat
records. However, if these patients are in the U.S., this simple act
may land their providers and caretakers in legal trouble: because a
shared password, even a voluntarily shared one, counts as unautho-
rized access by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act[13]. Preempt-
ing such behaviors would greatly inform usable security decisions
when designing and building this chatbot. For example, builders
may decide to use methods other than passwords to check for user
authorization and authentication status; to utilize the constraint
criteria, and outwardly warn users to not share their passwords
even with trusted providers and caregivers; or to add particular
terms in the end-user licensing agreement, security & privacy poli-
cies, or terms & services documents, and specify cases where the
patient could share passwords; or to build a security measure so
that patients can delegate access to their records to authenticated
providers and caregivers. To choose the most suitable usable secu-
rity mechanisms or combinations of such mechanisms, builders of
the chatbot would need to deliberate on which contexts, and espe-
cially which threat models they decide to focus on.
In comparison, example 2 has a very specific and focused profile
of targeted users (psychiatrists), so the inter-dependent properties
of behavior categorization and robustnesswould be straightforward
to analyze and design, and the assets and threat models are also rel-
atively clearly defined and direct. Meanwhile, because such system
is used for medical diagnosis, all attributes related to trustworthi-
ness need to be prioritized: the builders cannot assume that psychi-
atrists are trusting the ML system’s decisions. Moreover, while the
threat models are relatively simple compared to example 1 and 4,
the system still needs to induce trust from the psychiatrists: how
do they know it is them, instead ofmalicious attackers described in
the threat models, who see the images, patients’ information, and
the algorithm outputs? To address these issues, some security de-
signs may include: ML explanation options that accompany each
diagnosis; a side bar that shows access activities; or a device-based
two-factor authentication check. Again, it is up to both the ML and
security practitioners who build this system, to decide on the spe-
cific contexts and threats they would like to prioritize.
Example 3 also has a straightforward profile for behaviors as
example 2, but the threat models could be tricky: because depend-
ing on what the builders of the system decide to gather from both
the patients and providers for the match, assets that the system
needs to protect could swing a rather wide range. Meanwhile, be-
cause of the usual one-on-one nature of patient-provider relation-
ships, in contrast to example 1, de-prioritizing the availability of
security measures to large numbers of online users could be sensi-
ble, and the system might even be able to afford using more time-,
memory-, or computationally-complex security mechanisms that
are nonetheless usable for both providers and patients of the ser-
vice. For example, incorporating reciprocity into the human-system
interaction process, by engaging users in short Q&A games about
secure behaviors —which by theway, could also induces trust from
users about the system’s security, and fulfill part of the trustworthi-
ness requirement. But on the ML front, trustworthiness here is sim-
ilar to the premise of 1 but the spirit of example 2. While patients
and providers who choose to use a ML-powered matching service
could be assumed to have a greater degree of general trust in ML
and technology, the same level of trust could not be assumed in
the specific matching decisions: “How and why did this black-box
know that I would be a good fit for this patient/provider?” would
be the question to answer for every patient or provider who uses
the service.
Example 4 involves more diverse user groups (patients, providers,
likely other caregivers, and potentially policy-makers). Hence, the
assets need to be protected are more varied and diverse, the threat
modelsmore complex, the recovery scenarios more important, and
the usable security mechanisms may need to make trade-offs be-
tween availability and flexibility while still being functional when
processing live audio and video data, which is another subtle con-
straint on the complexity of usable securitymechanisms. Similar to
examples 2 and 3, the inevitable question of trustworthiness would
arise on the ML system’s decision rationales and explanations, and
there is also an incentive on the builders’ end to assure that algo-
rithms andmodels powering the system are not beingmanipulated.
Because the information being processed and analyzed by the sys-
tem is largely private and sensitive, convincing different users of
the effectiveness and strength of the security mechanisms is also
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an important task. Comparing it to example 1 where there are
clearer priorities, this system poses a set of full-on challenge for
usable security design, implementations, and evaluations.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In our work, we presented four categories of desired properties
— based on context, functionality, trustworthiness, and recovery
— to systematically frame and evaluate usable security in ML sys-
tem for mental health. We discussed those properties’ intents, ra-
tionales, and sources in the intersection of security, usability, ML,
and mental health. We propose that ML systems in mental health
be evaluated by the way of this framework for security and usabil-
ity, in different phases of the computer system life cycle.
We have analyzed, structured, and presented several examples
of ML systems in mental health in this framework, and for next
steps, we plan to evaluate more real-life ML systems in mental
health, preferably similar to the four described examples, so we
can test, validate, and improve our framework and criteria. Simul-
taneously, we also plan to interview builders of these ML systems
in mental health, to understand their awareness of, thought pro-
cesses behind, and decision rationales of usable security in the
systems they designed and built. Because the framework covers
the computer system life cycle, while we prefer already deployed,
large-scale systems, we are also happy to examine systems in early
stages of the cycle. We plan to publish results on websites where
this interdisciplinary community can also submit their own frame-
work evaluation results.
In a deeper dive, our future work will explore a tiered approach
to usable security forML systems, inspired by classic security literature[37],
meanwhile further examine interactions — e.g. trade-offs, enhance-
ments, overlaps from different perspectives, complements, and in-
terdependence — between desirable usability and security proper-
ties for ML systems in mental health.
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